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On indirect reports and language games: Evidence from Persian[1]

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Abstract: Approaching (indirect) reports from Wittgenstein's perspective on language games, and evaluating them with an eye on Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (RT), this paper draws on evidence from Persian to support Capone's Paraphrasis/Form Principle (PFP). It begins with a brief but informative review of relevant works on reported speech—including Davidson's Paratactic view of indirect reports, Wittgenstein's notion of language games, Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory, Weizman and Dascal's theory of clues and cues, and Lepore and Anderson's views about slurs. It then goes on to show how Capone's Paraphrasis/ Form Principle (PFP) functions as a more explanatorily adequate account of reported speech. In doing so, it describes how (indirect) reports are performed in Persian. The paper cites relevant examples from Persian to show that a semantico-pragmatic explanation of reported speech—like Capone's PFP—is more robust in adequately explaining the notion of 'samesaying' which lies at the heart of (indirect) reporting. Of utmost importance is the paper's attempt at showing how 'insincere' reporting through linguistic manipulations—like topicalization—can transform social realities.

Keywords: indirect reports, quotations, modes of presentation, paraphrasis/quotation principle, slurs.

0. Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) developed the philosophical concept 'language games' (German: *Sprachspiel*) to refer to «simple examples of language use» as well as the «actions into which the language is woven» (JAGO 2007: 17). Wittgenstein

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rejects the notion that language is a separate entity which corresponds to reality; rather, he argues that concepts, in order to be meaningful, do not need to be clearly defined. He distinguishes between 'forms of language' and the 'entirety of language itself', and employs 'language games' to refer to the former. The term 'language game' designates language forms that are simpler than the entirety of language. Wittgenstein saw all of a 'natural language' as comprising a family of language-games (JAGO 2007). For Wittgenstein, language games are connected by *Familienähnlichkeit* (or family resemblance); the speaking of language is part of an activity—a form of life—which gives language its meaning (JAGO 2007). Wittgenstein uses 'language game' in the following senses:

1) Fictional examples of language use: these are simpler than our own everyday language.

2) Simple uses of language: these are used in teaching language to children—training in language;

3) Specific regions of our language: this includes specific language activities (e.g., indirect reports) and their grammars and relations to other language-games.

Wittgenstein's notion of language games[2] analogized language rules to rules of games; this entails that saying something in a language is comparable to making a move in a game. An interpretation of this notion is that words find different meanings depending on the use to which they are put in different activities of human life. If Wittgenstein is right in assuming 'language rules' as 'rules of games', and tacitly suggesting that 'saying something in a language' is 'comparable to making a move in a game', then we can hypothesize that (indirect) reporting, as a language activity, is also a kind of language game. The researcher who, after Wittgenstein, stressed indirect reports as language games was Capone (2010a). He exploited Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of language games to expatiate upon his own view of indirect reports (or micro narratives) as 'language mini-games' sensitive to contextual factors and to the context of speech. Capone (2010 b) put forward his view of indirect reports as pragmemes. This view intersected in a number of ways with the view of indirect reports as language games (an issue explored in a different article by Capone (2012). In 2013, Capone explored the idea of multiple voices in indirect reports, exploiting his pragmatic ideas on quotation expressed in Capone 2013. How can one attribute a certain segment of an indirect report to this or that speaker? Is it possible to express multiple voices in the same indirect report? Capone's answer is positive. He resorts to clues and cues—and to the sophisticated pragmatic know-how of speakers and hearers allowing them to attribute different segments of speech to different voices. Capone's main idea is that the default inference in connection with an indirect report (unless clues militate in the opposite direction) is that the original speaker's voice (or the reported speaker's voice) is prevalent. Cases of slurring, according to Capone, are to be attributed to the reported speaker's voice, although complicity on the part of the reporting speaker who does not dissociate from the slurring is perceived. Now, it is

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[2] According to Dascal, Hintikka, and Lorenz (1996), this shows "the shift (in Wittgenstein's thought) from phenomenalism to physicalism, in the sense that language is no longer conceived of as a means of representing reality but as a means of creating (social) reality" (CAPONE 2012: 597; see also CAPONE 2013a).

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true that Capone's considerations are driven by abstract pragmatic principles, but we ask ourselves whether such ideas (as driven by abstract theories of language use based either on cognitive principles or on principles deriving from rationality and the immediate role played by Grice's Cooperative Principle in a theory of human rationality applied to communication) can pass the test of analysis in languages different from English and Italian. Considerations coming from Persian can be said to corroborate further the theoretical position held by Capone.

Capone's extensive research led him (a) to hypothesize a harmony between semantics and pragmatics, (b) to provide evidence supporting Sperber and Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory (RT), and to theorize his Paraphrasis/Form Principle. If his ideas can be backed by evidence from a variety of different languages, it will be a huge leap forward in terms of linguistic universals. In this connection, the current paper will provide evidence from Persian which aims at showing whether Capone's ideas are valid in relation to the Persian language or not. We will begin with a summary of relevant works including, among others, those of Wittgenstein (1953), Sperber and Wilson (1986), and Weizman and Dascal (1987), and will then provide a critical analysis of Capone's ideas with evidence from Persian which specifically addresses issues of transformations, voicing, cues and clues—as he himself argues that «the picture of indirect reporting which does not consider transformations, voicing, cues and clues is deeply flawed» (CAPONE 2012: 609). We will see if his Paraphrasis/Form Principle (PFP) is viable for Persian indirect reports, and if its explanatory adequacy for Persian helps it to endure Grice's (1989) Modified Occam's Razor[3].

1. Background

In a seminal article on the interplay of semantics and pragmatics in indirect reports, Capone (2010a) noted that the recursive rules of semantics (a) apply to a formal syntax, and (b) involve expressions at a level of 'logical form'; pragmatics, on the other hand, develops the logical forms generated by semantics into richer propositions; it relies heavily on 'social' and 'contextual' clues and cues to inject meaning into logical forms from outside, whereby it can determine the prominence of certain computations for any given logical form (See CAPONE 2005, 2010a,b; MEY 2001; SALMANI NODOUSHAN 1995, 2006, 2008, 2013; WOLFSON 1989). When a given surface sentence is liable to generate a wealth of logical forms, pragmatics orders them, makes some of them salient, and rules out the rest. As such, «semantics and pragmatics are part of a harmonious picture» (CAPONE 2010a: 377), and work in tandem.

To support his views about the harmony between semantics and pragmatics, Capone resorts to challenging Kasher's (1991) claims about the modularity of the pragmatic processes involved in understanding speech acts; Capone's argumentation is based

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[3] Everything else being the same, one would tend to choose a theory that is more parsimonious and tends to reduce levels of meaning (GRICE 1989: 47). As a principle of parsimony, economy, or succinctness used in logic and problem-solving, Occam's razor (in Latin *lex parsimoniae*) states that among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions should be selected (William of Ockham, c. 1287-1347).

on his view that «modular processes must be both mandatory and encapsulated» (CAPONE 2012: 601), and argues that explicatures («requiring 'modules on the fly' to search information») are modular and are thus non-cancellable. As for conversational implicatures, he believes that the pragmatic processes involved are either modular or non-modular; those that provide the 'propositional default inferences' are modular; however, if contextual clues and cues as well as (access to) vast archives (of encyclopedic knowledge) render them invalid, they are aborted and give their place to non-modular propositions (e.g., certain inferences) (See also CUMMINGS 2009). To support his argumentation, Capone draws on Weizman and Dascal's (1991)[4] description of 'clues' and 'cues'. According to Capone (2012: 603),

> Dascal and Weizman, following a tradition going back to Searle (1979), notice that understanding a speech act is often a matter of filling the gaps left there by the speaker by using pieces of information available in the context (whether intended as the specific situation of utterance or background and cultural information having a bearing on the utterance).

For Weizman and Dascal (1991: 18), 'clues' are elements of context that can be used for the «determination of utterance meaning and speaker's meaning», and cues are contextual elements that can be used «for the detection of gaps and mismatch».
Having an eye on the harmony between semantics and pragmatics, and at the same time exploiting his own theory of pragmemes (CAPONE 2005a,b), broached by Mey (2001) for the first time, Capone goes on to propose a Paraphrasis/Form Principle (PFP) which, in his view, governs (indirect) reports:

> The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (CAPONE 2010a: 377)

Nevertheless, Capone is cognizant of the fact that principles that govern language use «are tied to the function of utterances in discourse, and, thus, should be sensitive to the speaker's orientation to the communicative situation» (CAPONE 2010a: 378). With this in mind, he connects his PFP to Sperber and Wilson's (1984) RT which gives unity to his various considerations.
Before discussing this issue any further, let's present a brief review of what indirect reports are. Indirect reports involve a reported speaker and a reporting speaker—comparable to Wolfson's (1989) 'speaker' and 'addressor', respectively; in paraphrasis, for instance, the cited party is the 'reported speaker', and the citing party the 'reporting speaker'. They both cooperate with the hearer in a principle-based manner to make the communication work. Building on Wittgenstein's assumptions, Mey's (2001) perspective on societal pragmatics, and Dascal's (2003) perspective on

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[4] See also DASCAL and WEIZMAN (1987).

socio-pragmatics[5], Capone suggests that «making an indirect report is a more specific language game than is making a report» (2010a: 380), and explains how indirect reports, as cooperative[6] language games (framed[7] inside other games), «are based on norms or principles» to be learnt in «environments where actors engage in the practice» and norms are «rigidly enforced» (2012: 593). In Capone's view (2010a, 2012), indirect reports require (1) a reporter who aims at creating what Jaszczolt (2005) refers to as pragmatic equivalence and perhaps presenting multiple voices, (2) a piece of language behaviour to report, (3) a goal-oriented situation that motivates the reporting and constrains its form, and (4) an asymmetry of knowledge between the reporter and the hearer (unless the reporter aims at creating special effects). This can be summarized as X reports (R) Y's assertion (A)—*X R*s *Y's A*— (where X is the reporter, Y is the reportee, R stands for X's report, and A signifies Y's assertion).

At least two voices can be heard in an indirect report: the voice of X and that of Y. Recursiveness allows more than two voices in indirect reports (e.g., X said that Y said that Z had said that A). Capone draws on Bakhtin's (1984, 1986) ideas to suggest a polyphonic approach[8] to indirect reports whereby he emphasizes that «unless there are clues which can lead the hearer to recognizing separate voices, the reporter should do his best to represent (without interpolations) the reported speaker's voice» (2012: 594). Nevertheless, reporters often proffer reported speakers' voices as if they are their own; they 'samesay' reported speakers' assertions. This voicing phenomenon had earlier been noticed by Davidson (1968) whose treatment of «Galileo said that the earth moves» as «Galileo uttered a sentence that meant in his mouth what 'The earth moves' means now in mine» (CAPONE 2012: 594) had clearly indicated two voices—with its overt references to two mouths (that of X and that of Y); hence, the assumption of 'samesaying'.

As Capone noted, X and Y's samesaying is manifested in the equivalence between the two utterances in terms of 'intended' meaning—but not simply in terms of 'sentential' meaning. In other words, X should (re)produce a relevantly-synonymous R, *albeit* fine-tuned and adjusted to the situation of use and presented to the hearer (H) in the appropriate mode of presentation—but without taking responsibility for R (unless R is acceptable). As a 'fair play' rule in the game, X is expected not to attribute Y offenses, impoliteness, rudeness, obscenity, and the like (CAPONE 2012, 2013a)[9]. Therefore, altering A's phonological properties makes R infelicitous. For R to be true, «the voice of the reporter must allow hearers to 'reconstruct' the voice of

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[5] See also DASCAL, HINTIKKA, and LORENZ (1996).

[6] Indirect reports are cooperative language games because the hearer's presence in the game, ipso facto, "modifies or orients" the reporter's "choice of words" (See CAPONE 2012: 598).

[7] See GOFFMAN (1974).

[8] Polyphony is not a mere summation of voices; it is seen in the integration of the voices within a relationship of commentary—one being a comment on the other (CAPONE 2013a: 159-160).

[9] As a politeness rule of 'fair play' in the game, X is also expected to avoid complicity in the pragmatic force of Y's A if it can arouse strong negative reactions in many people.

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the reported speaker» (CAPONE 2012: 593), and this, in turn, requires that X should not alter Y's statements, intentions, and acts in any drastic way. Nevertheless, hearers are often able to separate reporting and reported voices by employing «contextual clues and large chunks of world knowledge» (CAPONE 2010a: 378)[10], and perhaps by relying on their own grammars of expectancy (OLLER 1975, 1978). Cues and clues are included in indirect reports because speakers intend their interlocutors/ hearers «to recognize different voices», «to separate voices attributing them to the original source, the current speaker [...] or some other person involved in context»[11], and «to recognize supportive and annotative aspects» (CAPONE 2013a: 154), where annotative aspects refer to those that are noted, supportive aspects allow speakers to make the indirect report, and depictive aspects relate to actually proffered words[12]. This is called the 'Decoupling Principle'.

Samesaying does not involve a verbatim reproduction of Y's assertions. Omissions, additions, summaries, and the like are allowed to the extent that they do not alter Y's assertions in a drastic way. However, something can be added in a way of comment. The famous rendering of '*arbeit macht frei*' with a vertically-flipped 'B' over the Auschwitz main gate by a captive blacksmith produced an implicature that could comment on Y's assertion. The blacksmith's rendering of the slogan, with his own intention injected into letter 'B' in '*arbeit*', compromised Nazi's intended message.

If indirect reporting aims at 'representing' reported speakers' intended meanings (i.e., they are «anchored to language's representative power» (CAPONE 2012: 597)), then what is the point in calling them language games? Nevertheless, Wittgenstein (1953) and Dascal et al. (1996) connect language games to 'action' that aims at 'creating social reality'. It can therefore be argued that, to qualify as a language game, (indirect) reporting needs to clearly show its bearing on 'action'. To show how indirect reports can relate to 'action', Capone (2012) argues that what Dascal, Hintikka, and Lorenz (1996) called the language game of 'presenting multiple voices'[13] is in fact embedded in 'indirect reports'. As such, in indirect reports, 'actions' are embedded inside 'representation'. Seen in this light, «reporting is a sort of action in that it transforms events in the light of the needs of hearers in the context of the reporting event» (CAPONE 2012: 597).

However, this derivative justification does not satisfy Capone, and he suggests that indirect reports are micro-narrations which he then sees in the larger scope of 'narration as action'. He argues that indirect reports are actions in the sense that they can transform reality and can have a number of consequences. They may be embedded in an argumentative structure which aims at 'spurring' people to act;

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[10] For a full discussion of cues and clues, see CAPONE (2012), TANNEN (1989), and DASCAL and WEIZMAN (1987).

[11] Indirect reports involve both the context of utterance of the reported speaker and that of the reporting speaker (CAPONE 2013a).

[12] See also CLARK and GERRIG (1990).

[13] DASCAL, HINTIKKA, and LORENZ (1996) show how the language game 'presenting multiple voices' can be used to illustrate 'possibly dissonant voices without wanting to harmonize them'.

hence, they can become 'a form of life'; they can create social reality (See CARAPEZZA and BIANCINI's important paper (2013); TANNEN, 1989; WITTGENSTEIN 1953). Like Dascal et al.'s 'presenting multiple voices' as well as other language games, indirect reports are 'cooperative' games in the sense that they involve at least three actors—namely the reported speaker, the reporting speaker, and the hearer—who cooperate in the game; listenership/readership helps the reporter determine which parts of the original speaker's speech needs transformations, and transformations are done to favor understanding on the part of the hearer; the reporter's task is to adapt to the hearer, and to make sure that the reported speaker's voice is prevalent.

Nevertheless, Lepore and Anderson (2013) present cases—those reporting slurring words—where the reporting speaker's voice seems to them to be prevalent. They account for this phenomenon by resorting to a 'rule of use' which assumes that both the reporting and the reported speakers should avoid slurs. They base their assumption on the failure of both conventional implicature and presupposition to explain the embarrassment caused by reporting slurs. Applauding this explanation for its envisaging indirect reports as language games bound by rules of use, Capone (2012), nevertheless, opts for a weaker version of this explanation which, unlike Lepore and Anderson's view, holds both the reported and the reporting speakers responsible for the offense that follows the use of slurs; Capone suggests that rules of use are 'societal', and that «using (or not using a word) is ultimately a matter of knowing societal, rather than linguistic uses» (CAPONE 2012: 600). We will return to this in our discussion of 'deontological' and 'teleological' conventional facts below.

As it was stated earlier, Capone (2012: 609) argues that «the picture of indirect reporting which does not consider transformations, voicing, cues and clues is deeply flawed». In the rest of this paper, we will focus on his views but provide evidence from Persian to see if his views are valid.

2. Reporting in Persian

Indirect reports in Persian, employ a two-place-predicator structure in which the 'plug' (plugs are usually *verba dicendi*) is the predicator, the reported speaker is the external argument, and the report is the internal argument (which can be extraposed by means of a that clause).

Example (1):

Persian: ʔostaad jomle-je mame raa lulu bord ra goft.

Lit: the professor sentence of the mamma the bogyman took said.

Trans: The professor said the opportunity was missed.

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When the second NP is heavy (has more than two words in it), it is extraposed into a that-clause (beyond the plug)—of course, the complementizer '*ke*' (meaning 'that') is optional. Compare:

Example (2):

Persian: ʔostaad goft (ke) mame raa lulu bord.

Lit: the professor said (that) the mamma the bogyman took.

Trans: The professor said that the opportunity was missed.

It should be noted that, in ancient Persian, there were no textual markers to separate quotations from indirect reports[14]. In modern Persian—in academic settings—the report, if quoted, is set off by a colon, and is wrapped within 'double angle quotation marks' «» (called '*giyume*' /ˌgijuˈme/). Of course, this is a borrowing from western linguistic practices. Compare examples 2 and 3.

Example (3):

Persian: ʔostaad goft: «mame raa lulu bord».

Lit: the professor said: «the mamma the bogyman took».

Trans: The Professor said, "the opportunity was missed."

These mechanics of writing are relatively recent additions to Persian orthography (borrowed from French some decades ago). Nevertheless, these textual markers are still missing in the spoken form of modern Persian where even 'finger dancing' is not employed to signal quotations.

This was a brief discussion of the 'linguistics' of (indirect) reporting in Persian; let's now return to Capone's (2012: 609) position that «the picture of indirect reporting which does not consider transformations, voicing, cues and clues is deeply flawed».

3. Voicing in Persian (indirect) reports

It seems as if the Persian reporter is an omniscient narrator with a third person point of view, reproducing what the reported speaker said in a 'verbatim' manner. In this connection, it should be noted that although English uses certain syntactic transformations (like the choice of tense) in indirect reports, Persian does not do so.

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[14] This can be confirmed through a close scrutiny of ink-written ancient Persian manuscripts. This fact supports considerations by Capone on quotation (CAPONE 2013b).

Example (4):

	English	Persian
Quotation:	Hasan said, "the bag is heavy."	hasan goft: «kif sangin ʔast».
Indirect report:	Hasan said that the bag was heavy.	hasan goft (ke) kif sangin ʔast.

This alludes to an interesting phenomenon; Persian reporters displace themselves into the reported speakers' spatio-temporal worlds in both quotations and indirect reports (w1). The same thing is observed in English narrative simple present tense, but in that case, narrators displace reported speakers into the present spatio-temporal world (w2). Samesaying is 100% perfect in Persian quotations and indirect reports—to the extent that it is possible to dispense with the colon and the double angle quotation marks, and to consider quotations as indirect reports. (In fact, this peculiar characteristic of Persian has failed many Iranian academics as plagiarizers simply because they have carried this Persian habit over to English). Nevertheless, in academic settings (and in translation), reporting speakers employ certain transformations that aim at simplifying the original speakers' language (without altering its pragmatic force) to minimize hearers' or readers' processing efforts—and to maximize their positive cognitive effects. The only tools that Persian indirect reporters have at their disposal to distance themselves from the original speaker (say, to criticize him, to give him more social power, etc.) is to play with the plug (or verb of saying) or to insert an appositive phrase between the topic and the plug set off by a pair of dashes.

Example (5):

English	John said, "the plane is late."
	John claimed that the plane was late.
	John, who is a liar, claimed that the plane was late.
Persian	jaan goft: «havaapeymaa takhir daarad».
	jaan ʔeddeʔaa kard havaapeymaa takhir daarad.
	jaan—ke ʔaadam e doruqguʔi ʔast—ʔeddeʔaa kard havaapeymaa takhir daarad.

The plug 'goft' (said) is objective and emotionally impartial; the plug 'ʔeddeʔaa kard' (claimed) criticizes John. However, in both cases, the Persian reporter is living at the same time in the same space with John, is an omniscient observer, and is a narrator of what John said; he adopts a third-person point of view for his 'live' recounting of what John is saying. Nevertheless, he does not accept responsibility for

what he reports but certainly accepts responsibility for the choice of plug and appositive interjections. Although reporters' 'playing with the plug' or 'presenting appositive interjections' gives listeners a 'contextual clue' to distinguish between the two voices, Persian listeners hold reporters responsible only for what plugs and the appositive interjections suggest, not what is reported in the clause following the plug. If reporters show infidelity in the report following the plug, listeners will have a hard time detecting the infidelity, and will have to rely on their own world knowledge to do so.

4. Transformations in Persian (indirect) reports

Before we describe modes of presentation in Persian reported speech, we need to describe Davidson's (1984) 'demonstrative view of quotations'. Although there are numerous theories of quotation[15], Persian indirect reports and quotations seem to lend support to that of Davidson in that, in Persian, whatever fills the 'quotative slot' after '*ke*' (or is wrapped inside '*giume*' following a colon) is a demonstration of the original speaker's assertions. A reporter may choose to paraphrase the original speaker's message, but Persian does not allow a change of pragmatic force or message form; this is in line with Capone's views (2010a, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).

It was stated earlier that, by default, reporters in Persian are allowed, through their choice of plugs and appositive interjections, to comment on their own attitudes towards the original speaker and his assertions. They are not allowed to transform the report in such a way as to change its pragmatic force.

Nevertheless, Persian has witnessed cases in which reporters have altered original speakers' statements. One of the ways through which original speakers' statements can be altered is the use of the syntactic strategy of 'topicalization'. This syntactic alteration which causes a metamorphosis of the original speaker's statements is sometimes employed intentionally to mislead the hearer, to create a new social reality, or to preach certain forms of social conduct. As such, it lends support to Tannen's (1989) idea that, like actions, indirect reports can transform reality.

To better understand this form of insincere reporting, let's imagine that about 1000 years ago a man, named John, who lived in world[1] at time[1] (i.e., in w1, t1) placed a glass of water on a table and said, "this is water". Now, imagine that today a reporter who lives in world[2] at time[2] (i.e., in w2, t2) places a glass of water on a table and says, "John said that '*this* is water'". While John's speech was inclusive and pluralistic in the sense that it accepted other things as water (e.g., what you see in oceans), what is delivered through our reporter's report is all-exclusive in the sense that it rejects anything else's being water, except for the substance in the glass he has placed on the table. In Persian, this kind of distortion often takes place through topicalization—a discursive technique and a pragmatic intrusion—but not a semantic one. Compare the following examples from English and Persian.

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[15] A number of theories of quotations include: quotations as names by TARSKI (1933) and QUINE (1940); quotations as descriptions by TARSKI (1933) and QUINE (1946); the identity theory of quotation by FREGE (1892), GARCÍA-CARPINTERO (1994) and WASHINGTON (1992). For a description of theories of quotation, see CAPONE (2013a).

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	English	Persian
John:	This is water.	ʔin ʔaab ʔast. (This entity is water)
Reporter:	*This* is water.	ʔaab ʔin ʔast. (Water is ONLY THIS entity)

'*ʔaab*' (water) is the predicator in '*ʔin ʔaab ʔast*'; when it is syntactically 'topicalized' (as in '*ʔaab ʔin ʔast*'), it injects an implicature into the actual utterance that excludes things other than the substance in our reporter's glass from being water[16].

Throughout the history of Iran, this kind of pragmatic intrusion has been used to alter the social reality, and to enforce new social orders. If it is true that the point of indirect discourse might be fairly taken to be «to introduce and produce a given utterance that gives the content of the original speaker's utterance» (BURGE, 1986:196), and if it is also true that 'a fair report requires that the point of view of the reporter should not prevail over those of the original speaker' (CAPONE 2010a; see also ROBINSON, 2003:107; BAKHTIN, 1984:187), then it can be claimed that syntactic topicalization in Persian will result in a pragmatic intrusion and will produce reports that are partial and insincere.

5. Cues and clues in Persian (indirect) reports

It was stated earlier that, like any other language, Persian indirect reports are, in a sense, intra-translations or simplifications of the original speaker's speech. It was also stated that reporters in Persian are allowed to separate their voices from that of the original speaker through their choice of plug and appositive interjections (e.g., when the original speaker's speech includes foul language). 'Plugs' and 'appositive interjections' are clues that help listeners to separate the reporter's voice from that of the original speaker, and to compute the text and the reporter's meanings (See WEIZMAN and DASCAL 1991). By giving reporters this option to distance themselves from the original speaker, reporters are not normally held responsible for possible cases of slurs in their reports; the original speakers are always held responsible for foul language in Persian; this supports Capone's (2012) stance but contradicts Lepore and Anderson's (2013) position. It was stated earlier that Lepore and Anderson favor a 'rule of use' explanation which prevents people from using slurs, foul language, obscene words, and the like. They argue that the rule applies to both the original speaker and the reporter, and assume that in cases where reporters report slurring words, they will be held responsible for the offence that ensues. Applauding Lepore and Anderson for their perspective on indirect reporting as a

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[16] This reminds us of the difference between concepts and applications (of concepts). It is obvious to us, since advances in the pragmatics of the law, that language can be rejuvenated through applications of concepts, which are a function of the contexts in which those concepts are applied.

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language game subject to rules of use, Capone (2012: 600) argues that, «to master the practice of the language game 'reporting speech', we must know what uses are licit or prohibited [...] what practices society allows and what practices it bans» (CAPONE 2012: 600).

In Persian reports, since reporters have the option to inject their own views and feelings into 'plugs' and/or 'appositive interjections', they are not held responsible for whatever belongs to the report, be it a 'paraphrased that-clause' or a 'direct quotation'. Nevertheless, they will certainly be held responsible for any infidelity they may show to the original speaker's message; if their reporting of the original speaker's message is insincere, 'reprimands' and 'confrontations' may be in order. When the original speaker's speech includes sensitive material (e.g., slangs, obscenity, vulgarity, foul language, etc.), reporters are expected to choose a plug that distances them from the original speaker and helps them avoid complicity. Now, let's return to example (1):

Persian:	Ɂostaad jomle-je mame raa lulu bord ra goft.
Lit:	the professor sentence of the mamma the bogyman took said.
Trans:	The professor said the opportunity was missed.

The professor's assertion is a 'proverb' in Persian (meaning 'you no longer have access to what was available for you before'); ordinarily, Iranians do not attach any negative meaning to it; the word '*mame*' (meaning 'mamma' or 'udder') is in fact a euphemism for the derogatory word *'pestaan'* ('breast')[17]. People normally use '*mame*' to avoid using *'pestaan'*. However, if our imaginary professor uses this 'hygienic' and 'euphemized' proverb in a formal lecture, it will be considered 'dirty language' and will shock the audience. Nevertheless, he may want to use it to project a popular image of himself. If reporters report it in a verbatim manner, hearers will undoubtedly inject a negative meaning into the 'euphemized' word and attributed the offense to the professor, not to the reporters; reporters will be sincere to the message and to the professor, so they cannot be held responsible for the offense.

As a normative ethical position, deontological ethics judges the morality of an action (e.g., using foul language) based on the action's adherence to, and observation of, ethical rules, sometimes described as 'obligation', or 'duty'; in other words, there are rules that bind you to your duty. Teleological ethics, on the other hand, judge the morality of an action by its consequences (KAMM 2007). Seen in this light, taboos, obscenity, vulgarity, defamatory expressions and other libelous linguistic forms seem to have a 'deontologically-impolite' content. It can be hypothesized that this content was injected into them from outside in the first place when they were teleological in

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[17] "Mamma the bogyman took" is a Persian proverb. In the past, when a kid of more than two years of age approached his mom and wanted to be breastfed, the mother said "mame raa lulu bord" which meant 'a bogyman came and took the breast away with him, so I have no breast any more to breastfeed you. This is now a proverb in Persian which means "the opportunity that you had in the past, no longer exists for you". (Bogyman: an imaginary evil character of supernatural powers, esp. a mythical hobgoblin supposed to carry off naughty children. (American Heritage Dictionary)).

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essence, but that they transformed, via diachronic reinforcement in a social-constructivist process of cognition modification, into 'deontological' conventional facts or cognitive archetypes—resulting in the collective speakers' modified cognitive structures[18]. This deontological content signals that they should be avoided at any cost. In other words, there is a kind of archetypal social and popular phobia binding on all language users that 'deontologically-impolite language' should be avoided[19]. Slangs, obscenity, vulgarity, and the like «arouse strong negative reactions in many people and are used by only a portion of the population» (FALK 1978: 69). As such, both the original speaker and the reporter are 'ethically obliged' to avoid semantically-impolite foul words (and language); this is a 'societal' and 'ethical' 'rule of use'. If the original speaker has not avoided foul language, he is a 'rule breaker'. The reporter should not be his accomplice. He should avoid depicting his speech; rather, he should describe it in polite language. This lends support to Capone's (2010a: 377) view that «semantics and pragmatics are part of a harmonious picture», and that they work in tandem. It is also in line with Capone's stance that:

> Since using depictive elements involves taking the shortest route in the description process, when there is an alternative route which by embarking on a transformation involves greater processing efforts (and production efforts), it is clear that the avoidance of greater processing costs is taken as a sign of complicity, while the more costly transformation is taken (or would be taken) as a way of signaling that one is distancing oneself from the offensive segment of talk. We could consider 'complicity' a language game, in which two voices blend in case they share the same point of view. While in the normal case in which two speakers have different points of view, they tend to differentiate their voices, in the case of complicity two voices are presented as undifferentiated. Indirect reports are prototypical cases in which an utterance gives expression to two voices, the original speaker and the reporter. Thus, it goes without saying that an indirect report should present two slots in case the original speaker's voice and the reporter's voice are differentiated and only one slot in case the two voices blend (being undifferentiated). The presence of just one slot, instead of two slots clearly exhibits the complicity between the two voices. (CAPONE 2013a: 181)

6. Conclusions

Based on the discussion presented in this paper and the evidence provided by the case of Persian, it can be concluded that Capone's perspective on indirect reports can be supported. His Paraphrasis/Form Principle has explanatory adequacy for Persian indirect reports too. The paper also showed evidence from Persian supports Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory, Davidson's 'demonstrative' view of quotations, and Capone's notion of 'societal' rules of use.

Indirect reports in Persian, like in English, are language games that fit in the framework proposed by Wittgenstein (1953). It was argued in the paper that certain modes of presentation of 'indirect reports' (e.g., topicalization) can transform a 'pluralistic' reality into an all-new and all-exclusive reality. It can therefore be

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[18] See FEUERSTEIN (1990) and VYGOTSKY (1978).

[19] More on this in a future monograph on "the secret life of slurs"

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concluded that indirect reports, as forms of action, are capable of changing social realities and creating new social realities. This conclusion supports Capone's (2010b) ideas.

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Appendix

Guide to Persian transcription symbols.

Symbol	Example	Symbol	Example	Symbol	Example
aa	arm	p	pen	t	tea
o	or	s	so	j	joke
u	too	ch	change	h	house
a	hat	x	xub	d	door
e	ten	z	zoo	r	red
i	sheep	zh	vision	sh	shoe
q	Qom	n	noon	f	foot
k	kill	y	yard	g	good
l	land	ʔ	ʔalʔaan	m	moon
v	voice	b	bad		

Notes:

1. The /ʔ/ symbol represents glottal stop, and is used at the beginning of Persian syllables followed by a vowel.
2. The /q/ (i.e., a radical stop) and /x/ (i.e., a radical fricative) represent Persian-specific consonants.
3. The Persian sporadic feature *tashdid* is represented by the repetition of the phoneme that receives it.