Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional/ Non-rationalized judgement within rational thinking

  • María Dolores García-Arnaldos
Keywords: Non-inferential knowledge, Wittgenstein, Hinge propositions, Wright, Basic inference


In this article, we consider Wittgenstein’s approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgenstein’s rule-following analysis, Frege’s theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior to the understanding of any rule, requires having grasped the conditions of verification of a rule, which is a source of problems. Following Wright’s construing of Wittgenstein’s ideas, we maintain that understanding concepts cannot be prior to the linguistic ability. When you grasp concepts, you already possess linguistic ability. From the proposal of both authors, we conclude that there are some basic rules or inferences that can be understood as mental actions whose movement constitutes rational thought.


Austin, J. L. (1961), Performative utterances, in J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (eds.), Philosophical Papers, Clarendon Press.

Burge, T. (1993), «Content Preservation», in The Philosophical Review, vol. 102, pp. 457-488.

Carnap, R. (1937), The Logical Syntax of Language, Routledge, London.

Carnap, R. (1947), Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1956.

Coffa, J. A. (1991), The semantic tradition from Kant to Carnap. To the Vienna Station. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Coliva, A. (2010), Moore and Wittgenstein. Skepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, Palgrave MacMillan, London.

Coliva, A. (2013), «Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Skepticism, Certainty and Common Sense», in Philosophia, Vol. 41, Issue 1, pp 1-12.

Coliva, A. (2015), Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire.

Field, H. (1996), «The A prioricity of logic», in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 96, pp. 359-379.

Field, H. (2001), Apriority as an Evaluative Notion, in Field, H., Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, Oxford, cap. 13, pp. 361-391.

Frege, G. (1918-19), Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung, in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I, pp. 58-77 (Thought, eng. tr., in Michael Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxfrod 1997).

Glock, H. J. (2010), Necessity, A Priority and Analyticity: A Wittgensteinian Perspective, in Whiting, D. (ed.) The Later Wittgenstein on Language, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, pp. 133-147.

Kant, I. (1781), Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Riga; Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1998 (Crítica de la razón pura, sp. tr., Colihue, Buenos Aires 2007).

Kripke, S. (1981), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

McGinn, M. (2011), Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D., The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge, London, pp. 763-773.

McGinn, M. (2012), «Non-Inferential Knowledge», in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. CXII, Part 1, pp. 1-27.

Pritchard, D. (2016), Radical Skepticism: Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of our Believing, Princenton University Press, Princenton.

Stroll, A. (1994), Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Oxford University Press, New York.

Villarmea, S. (2008), Sentido y concimiento: Un análisis epistemológico de diferentes tipos de proposición en Sobre la certeza y en el Tractatus, en Fernández Moreno, L. Para leer a Wittgenstein, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, pp. 133-154.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Philosophisce Untersuchungen, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe & R. Rhees, Philosophical Investigations, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1958 (Investigaciones Filosóficas, transl. by Alfonso García Suárez y Ulises Moulines, Crítica, Madrid 1988).

Wittgenstein, L. (1956), Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, G.H. von Wright, Blackwell, Oxford, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 3rd ed., Blackwell, Oxford 1981 (Observaciones sobre los fundamentos de la matemática, transl. by Isidoro Reguera, Alianza Editorial, Madrid 1987).

Wittgenstein, L. (1969a), Über Gewissheit, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M Anscombe & Denis Paul, On Certainty, Blackwell, Oxford (Sobre la Certeza, transl. by Josep L. Prades; Vicent Raga, Gedisa, Barcelona 2000).

Wittgenstein, L. (1969b), Philosophische Grammatik, ed. R. Rhees, Philosophical Grammar, Blackwell, Oxford 1974.

Wittgenstein, L. (1979), Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935: From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald (eds.), Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, NJ.

Wright, C. (1985), «Facts and Certainty», in Proceedings of the British Academy, 71, pp. 429-72, reprinted in T. Baldwin and T. Smiley (eds.) Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, pp. 51-94.

Wright, C. (2001), Rails to Infinity: Essays in Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigatios, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass).

Wright, C. (2004), Wittgensteinian certainties, in McManus, D. (ed.) Wittgenstein and Scepticism, Routledge, London 2004, pp. 22-55.

Wright, C. (2007), «Rule-following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question», in Ratio, vol. XX, n. 4, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 481-502.

Wright, C. (2014), «Comments on Paul Boghossian, “What Is Inference?”», in Philosophical Studies, vol. 169, pp. 27-37.

How to Cite
García-Arnaldos, M. D. (1) “Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional/ Non-rationalized judgement within rational thinking”, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 12(2). Available at: http://www.rifl.unical.it/index.php/rifl/article/view/505 (Accessed: 29September2023).