Saving one's face. On interpreting facial expressions

Abstract

The article examines the debates on facial expressions. Darwin’s distinction between natural and conventional expressions was reinterpreted by Paul Ekman, whose notion of universal “basic emotions” and microexpressions rests on a fragile conception of universality. Augustine’s typology of natural versus intentional signs assigns a peculiar status to the face as a site of involuntary expressions, raising paradoxes about truth, lying, and communicative intention. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s reflections reveal skepticism toward deterministic models of expression, emphasizing the interpretative and inferential dimensions of our engagement with the face. By bringing these perspectives into dialogue with William James’s theory of emotions and with contemporary debates on digital faces and artificial intelligence, the article highlights how the face remains a contested semiotic space. It concludes by proposing a conciliatory semiotic approach that preserves the expressive complexity of the face against reductionist readings.